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Pre-Summit Positioning
January 17, 2011 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | Permalink

By Scott Kennedy
Preparations for Wednesday’s state visit by Hu Jintao have been underway for several months. Most of
that time was spent negotiating over what deals would be reached, whether there would be a joint
statement, and what food would be served. I’m particularly interested to see: 1) Whether Chinese first
lady Liu Yongqing will eat the standard fare put on the table as everyone else. She typically travels
with her own chef and food; and 2) Whether the American media will get a good photo of the back of
Hu Jintao’s head to determine once and for all if he has a bald spot. Chinese media are forbidden to
ever shoot him from behind. CNN, please…
In actuality, one of the most interesting turns of the past week has been the contrasting positioning
the American and Chinese sides have adopted.
President Obama sent out his four department chiefs in charge of foreign policy to give China-specific
speeches. Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of Treasury Geithner, Secretary of Commerce Locke,
and Secretary of State Clinton all sang the same tune: The United States and China are very different,
and China needs to adapt its behavior, if not its views, in order for it to be accepted as a member of
mainstream international society.
Secretary Gates focused on China’s military build-up and the PLA’s limited transparency, while Geither
and Locke focused on a variety of Chinese market barriers, from the Renminbi’s value to indigenous
innovation policies that put American firms at a disadvantage in China and elsewhere. But it
was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s address, the last of the four, which brought all of the various
components together in one coherent and complete message.
Her statement had a clear logical coherence to it: The US and China are different > The United States
is the steward of international society > International society is built on multilateral institutions >
China is still not a full member of international society > China must change its security, economic,
and human rights policy to come into compliance with its international obligations, which is for its own
good and the good of the rest of the world > Mutual trust can only be built by China taking concrete
steps to adopt these changes.
A few examples:
The US and China have differences:
“We are two complex nations with very different histories, with profoundly different political systems
and outlooks.”
“To keep our relationship on a positive trajectory, we also have to be honest about our differences. We
will address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have to do together. And we
have to avoid unrealistic expectations that can be disappointed. This requires steady effort over time
to expand the areas where we cooperate and to narrow the areas where we diverge, while holding
firm to our respective values.”
Trust depends on action:
“The success of the relationship depends on its ability to deliver positive results to the people of both
our nations, first and foremost, but also to the rest of the world.”
China must act in the context of international institutions:
“Embracing the obligations that come with being a 21st century power will help to realize a future that
will give the Chinese people even more, in fact, unimagined opportunities. But that means accepting a

share of the burden of solving common problems, abiding by and helping to shape a rules-based
international order.”
In its stress on differences and the importance of multilateral institutions, the Obama Administration’s
tone is quite different from that of his predecessor. Certainly the US has not forsaken power politics,
but Secretary Clinton’s speech was entirely consistent with the liberal internationalist school of
international relations theory. The final giveaway was her not so subtle attack against realism:
“In the 21st century, it does not make sense to apply zero-sum 19th century theories of how major
powers interact. We are moving through uncharted territory. We need new ways of understanding the
shifting dynamics of the international landscape, a landscape marked by emerging centers of
influence, but also by non-traditional, even non-state actors, and the unprecedented challenges and
opportunities created by globalization. This is a fact that we believe is especially applicable to the U.SChina relationship. Our engagement – indeed, I would say our entanglement – can only be understood
in the context of this new and more complicated landscape.”
Why has the US decided to emphasize differences in the run-up to the visit?
For one, in the wake of the financial crisis China appears to have calculated that it could be more
assertive in a number of policy areas, and this newfound confidence was exhibited across the policy
spectrum, and highlighted the different positions of the US and China. In the last year it has become
clear China overstepped. That has led to a backlash by China’s neighbors, and the US has capitalized
on this uneasiness. Its relationships with countries around China, save North Korea, are increasingly
robust. Hence, the US is surprisingly in a position of strength against China.
For two, although President Obama’s domestic political standing has risen of late, he cannot be seen
to coddle the Chinese on any issue lest he make himself vulnerable to attacks about being weak on
defense, not defending American jobs, or sacrificing American values. If the visit were in Beijing,
American rhetoric may not have been as strident.
And for three, President Hu’s political fortunes are most assuredly on the downswing. He has another
21 months as Party Secretary and 26 months as president, and the clock is ticking. Although he has
led China to be more assertive, he also likely does not want to be seen as having wrecked the
relationship. The US side may be gambling that the best defense against a Chinese leader on the way
out is a good offense.
The Obama Administration’s approach not only differs from W’s but also from that of the Chinese
side. In response to written questions from the Washington Postand Wall Street Journal, Hu Jintao
stressed the common interests of both countries. His grammar was the reverse of Secretary Clinton’s:
We may have some differences, but our common interests are so clear that the two countries must
cooperate. Moreover, his description of China took it as a given that China is a leading global power
and a central member of the international system, and such standing is not conditional on US
approval:
“China and the United States have major influence in international affairs and shoulder important
responsibilities in upholding world peace and promoting common development. Under the new
circumstances, the common interests of our two countries have been growing and areas of
cooperation expanding. There is great potential for our mutually beneficial cooperation both in
advancing Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and in improving global economic governance and
promoting sustainable growth of the world economy; both in expanding cooperation in economy and
trade and in strengthening cooperation in new areas like new energy sources, clean energy,
infrastructure development and aviation and space; and both in fighting terrorism and preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in meeting challenges like natural disasters, food
security and major communicable diseases.”
It will be fascinating to see if the two sides’ pre-summit approaches carry over to the visit itself. Not
only will I be watching to see what is on Ms. Liu’s plate, I’ll be anxiously listening to the toasts of two
presidents. Ganbei!
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